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ASSESSING THE LONG-RUN ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
LABOUR LAW SYSTEMS: A THEORETICAL
REAPPRAISAL AND ANALYSIS OF NEW TIME SERIES
DATA
Simon Deakin and Prabirjit Sarkar*

I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of the economic impact of labour laws has been the focus of
intense inquiry and debate at transnational level since the early 1990s,
with the publication of the OECD’s Jobs Study (OECD, 1994), and before
that played a significant role in the formation of public policy in certain
countries, most notably America and Britain, which underwent a process
of labour market deregulation in the course of the 1980s. Throughout this
period the predominant view within economic theory has been to see
labour law rules as interferences with the operation of markets, and as
therefore requiring justification on market-failure or related grounds if
they are not to result in inefficiencies or distortions. Yet it has proved
surprisingly difficult to demonstrate empirically that labour law rules have
the negative effects contended for them (see Baker et al., 2005). One
possible reason for this is that labour law rules have many beneficial
economic impacts which may operate alongside, or offset the effects of,
their negative ones: these include overcoming the wage- and employment*
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depressing effects of employer monopsony (Card and Krueger, 1997;
Manning, 2005), encouraging firms to use labour more productively
(Rubery and Edwards, 2003), stabilizing employment over the economic
cycle (Amable, Demmou and Gatti, 2007), and promoting a cooperative
industrial relations climate with knock-on effects in terms of the reduction
of unemployment (Feldmann, 2008). Labour law is also highly effective
in promoting social goals such as the reduction of wage inequality
(Freeman, 2005).
Alongside this empirical reassessment, there has been a growing interest in
theories which view labour law, together with other forms of market
regulation, in comparative political economy terms. In this approach,
labour laws are seen as the outcome of macroeconomic conditions,
interest-group configurations and legal-political structures which are
embedded in particular national contexts. Labour laws are therefore, in
part at least, endogenous to the wider economic and political systems
within they operate. An implication of this approach is that legal rules do
not operate in a straightforwardly instrumental way to reshape economic
outcomes. This is for several reasons. Formal legal rules are not so much
external forces reshaping markets according to political will, as they are
codified conventions which to a certain extent reflect and embody existing
market practices. The impacts of changes in the formal law are mediated
through self-regulatory mechanisms and social norms of varying degrees
of formality, introducing an element of unpredictability into their
operation. In addition, legal rules do not operate upon exchange
relationships in isolation, but in conjunction with other, interlocking
elements within the regulatory framework.
In particular, labour
regulations interact with complementary mechanisms such as corporate
governance rules and product market regulation (Amable, 2004). For
these various reasons, then, changes to labour law institutions may not
have the effects predicted for them by orthodox supply-and-demand
models.
A related feature of recent analyses has been the attempt to achieve a
better empirical understanding of legal systems. The legal origins school
has focused attention on the role which legal infrastructure – broadly
speaking, the institutional framework for rule-making in a given society –
plays in shaping the substantive content of regulation (La Porta et al.,
2008). To study this effect, novel empirical methods, involving the
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construction of indices attempting to measure the intensity of legal
regulation across national regimes, have been developed. The strong-form
legal origins hypothesis, which claims to identify a sharp bifurcation of
legal systems along the lines of the common law/civil law divide, remains
highly contentious both theoretically and empirically (see Ahlering and
Deakin, 2007). However, the idea that legal institutions may be
responsible, in part at least, for the persistence of cross-national diversity
in approaches to economic regulation, is in the process of gaining wider
acceptance, and thereby opening up new lines of analysis.
In this paper we seek to advance the debate over the economic impact of
labour law in two ways. We aim firstly to show how re-theorising law as
an embedded institutional phenomenon, at least partly endogenous to the
process of economic development within market economies, results in
new perspectives on the economic impact of labour law rules. Section 2
reviews the relevant theories. Then we address the empirical question of
how changes to labour law impact on the economy by introducing new
evidence in the form of time-series data on legal change. To this end,
section 3 discusses the methodology of index construction as it applies to
labour law and other forms of legal regulation of the business enterprise
(company and insolvency law), and presents first results from a newly
created dataset examining changes in labour law in three major European
countries, as well as the US, since the early 1970s. Section 4 concludes.

II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF LABOUR LAW RULES

A. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FORCES SHAPING LABOUR MARKET
INSTITUTIONS

The standard economic critique of labour regulation takes the view that
labour law rules operate as external interferences with market relations.
This is to assume not simply that the market operates, in the absence of
legal regulation, in a self-equilibrating way, correcting itself in response to
temporary distortions or imperfections; it is also to assume that legal
institutions are exogenous to the processes of market formation and
operation. Labour law rules, it is suggested, originate largely in the rent-
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seeking activities of organized interest groups. Rent-seeking reduces
efficiency by channeling resources away from wealth-creation to
redistribution. More generally, while labour law rules may be seen as
responses to market failures which include monopsony effects and
asymmetries of information, regulatory failure is also a strong possibility,
with the result that labour laws are rarely matched in a precise way to the
inefficiencies they purport to address; they are just as likely to introduce
fresh distortions.
This view has been challenged by a variety of approaches in which labour
market institutions, including labour laws and regulations, are seen as
endogenously generated by a combination of economic and political forces
operating at the level of nation states (and, to a lesser degree, at subnational regional level and at transnational level). The starting point is to
understand institutions as devices for coordinating the expectations of
actors. As responses to market failures of various kinds, they emerge out
of particular market settings. Norms of varying degrees of formality
embody or encode solutions to coordination problems which have stood
the test of time. They are not distributionally neutral; they involve
compromises on rent-sharing which, if they endure, can provide the basis
for long-term contractual cooperation. The basic form of the employment
contract in developed market economies is an illustration of this: the
contract reserves powers of coordination and control to the employer in
return for access to mechanisms of insurance and income smoothing
which protect the worker against risks inherent in employee status,
including unemployment. The ‘contract’ in this sense refers both to a
convention which is widely, if sometimes loosely, understood by market
actors, and also to a formal legal institution which is ‘script-coded’ within
the discourse of the legal system (Carvalho and Deakin, 2008). The legal
system associates ‘employment’ with a certain normative structure, which
is derived, in part, from practices which have grown up around contracting
in labour markets, and in part reflects the internal conceptual or dogmatic
language used by the law to describe those relationships. The law does
not simply impose normative expectations of behaviour from outside; it
also, to some degree, crystallizes social practices which are drawn from
the experiences of market actors (Deakin, 2003).
The core institutions of labour law – including collective bargaining laws,
unemployment insurance schemes, minimum wage laws, and employment
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protection legislation – are based to a large degree on models first
developed at the level of particular industries or firms, or in certain
localities. State-based unemployment compensation systems at the turn of
the twentieth century drew on the practice of northern European cities and
localities (one particularly influential model was known as the ‘Ghent
system’) and on trade unions’ schemes for mutual insurance. The
statutory model of codetermination in Germany has multiple origins which
include the paternalistic practices of large firms as well as workers’
attempts at self-organisation in the early decades of the twentieth century.
The mid-twentieth century arrival of unfair dismissal legislation took place
against the widespread use of structured internal labour markets and
bureaucratic management techniques in large firms. In the European
context, each of these legislative initiatives has been supported, at one
point or another, by both management and labour (although not always by
both at the same time), and in some cases they were introduced by centreright parties. Labour legislation cannot be explained as serving the
interests of organized labour alone.
The legal system, as it is able to mobilise the monopoly of enforcement
which an effective state possesses, extends and standardizes practices
which are perceived to have been successful at firm or industry level. The
standardisation of social practices through law is a technique used to
reduce the transaction costs which would otherwise be involved in market
actors searching for solutions from scratch each time a coordination failure
arose (Warneryd, 1998). It also helps to reduce the threat of mutual
defection in prisoner’s-dilemma type situations, where individually
rational behaviour would lead to a net welfare loss (Hyde, 2006).
However, no legal rule operates on the basis of perfect enforcement.
Legal sanctions can alter incentives, but the successful implementation of
legal rules necessarily depends to some degree on the existence of the
understandings of market actors, beyond the legal system itself (Aoki,
2001). Bargaining takes place not on the assumption of the complete legal
enforcement of contracts, but ‘in the shadow of legal rules’ which may be
triggered in an endgame situation, but which most of the time remain in
the background.
Labour laws, like any other form of market regulation, are not made in a
vacuum, and nor are they the result of a purely disinterested and
technocratic process of rule formation, although there is a role for
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expertise in their drafting. Because they have (and are meant to have)
redistributive consequences, they reflect the power and influence of
interest groups and their capacity to mobilize the political process to their
ends. Solutions which ‘work’ for some groups will normally involve
losses for others, and will be resisted even if they give rise to net welfare
gains at a societal level. However, the process of rule formation is not just
an expression of the relative bargaining positions of the different interest
groups. Because legal and political institutions are relatively slow to
change in relation to the macroeconomic and political cycles, they may
have an independent role in framing the interactions of the groups; in
particular, they may alter their composition and shape the coalitions they
make. More generally, the relative rigidity and longevity of institutions
implies a role for complementarities of various kinds which then generate
cross-national diversity of practice.
An example of this, which has been extensively studied in the comparative
political economy literature, is the influence of voting systems. A link has
been suggested between proportional representation and interest group
support for a mix of policies involving a high level of employment
protection, on the one hand, and legal support for the concentration of
share ownership, on the other. This is said to be because proportional
representation encourages coalition building between interest groups
representing labour market insiders and corporate blockholders. It is
argued that in majority-voting systems, by contrast, the most likely
interest-group alignments are those which favour a conjunction of
financial market liberalization and labour market flexibility (Gourevitch
and Shinn, 2005; Pagano and Volpin, 2005).
Macroeconomic conditions may play a role in shaping institutions. For
example, high and persistent unemployment may be a factor in rising
union density, in systems, such as the Nordic ones, where unions rather
than the state play the main role in providing social insurance (Checchi
and Nunziata, 2007); in systems where unions’ main function is wage
determination, such as Britain, union membership and militancy fluctuate
according to the strength or weakness of inflationary pressures. Because
union strength has been one of the factors affecting the content of labour
law in Britain, at least during most of the twentieth century, there is a
relationship between the inflationary cycle and the trajectory of labour
legislation (Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005: ch. 4). If union membership and
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activity on the one hand and labour legislation on the other are
endogenous to the macroeconomic cycle, it becomes difficult to
disentangle the direction of causation: do institutional changes have
economic impacts or are they themselves the consequence of
macroeconomic shifts (Rodrik, 2005)?
Some accounts see present-day institutional configurations as having deep
historical roots. Iversen and Soskice (2007) argue that the divergence
between liberal market and coordinated market systems can be traced back
to the period, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the
modern institutions of representative democracy were being formed in
western Europe. Systems which opted for proportional representation
(PR) ended up favouring coalition building and consensus-based policies,
which resulted in a bias towards redistribution, wage compression,
economic coordination and strong welfare states.
By contrast,
majoritarian voting systems had a centre-right bias, which over time
resulted in a tendency towards limited redistribution, minimal welfare
states, and a liberal economic framework. In coordinated market systems,
employers accepted unemployment compensation systems based on high
replacement rates and, in time, the complementary institution of
employment protection legislation, in order to encourage workers to invest
in firm-specific skills. In liberal market systems, which placed les
emphasis on firm-specific skill formation, neither employers nor workers
had strong incentives to press for strict employment protection or high
replacement rates in unemployment insurance. Why then did certain
systems adopt PR at the critical point of institutional development at the
end of the nineteenth century? Iversen and Soskice’s detailed argument on
this point is that in the Nordic and northern European systems,
industrialization took place in a context where economic coordination
through guild systems and localized forms of employer and worker
solidarity remained strong, and where a proto-corporatist framework of
political representation of organized economic groupings or, as they were
traditionally known, ‘estates’, continued to operate. In Britain, by
contrast, guild systems were largely swept away in the early nineteenth
century, and associational interests did not have direct representation in
the political process. The upshot is that ‘the advanced countries with
strong welfare states today are those in which economies were locally
coordinated a century and a half ago; and whose state tradition was one of
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functional representation and limited autonomy of government to different
interests’ (Iversen and Soskice, 2007: 37).

B. THE LEGAL SYSTEM AS A SOURCE OF PATH-DEPENDENCE AND
CROSS-NATIONAL DIVERSITY: THE LEGAL ORIGIN HYPOTHESIS
Legal origins theory offers another long-run historical explanation for
diversity, but sees the legal system itself, and more precisely legal
infrastructure or the framework for law-making, as a principal cause of the
persistence of national patterns of regulation and for divergence at a crossnational level. Common law systems, because of the predominant role
they are thought to accord to judge-made law over that of legislation as a
form of rule-making, are said to have a bias in favour of market-creating
rules and a laissez-faire approach to the governance of the business
enterprise. In civil law systems, reliance on codes and general statutory
restatements of legal principle is seen as privileging a regulatory style
which results in redistribution at the expense of wealth creation, and is
predisposed towards market regulation (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002). Two
‘channels’ are identified as the links between legal infrastructure and the
substantive content of rules: an ‘adaptability’ channel, according to which
the common law is inherently more adaptive than the civil law in the sense
of being responsive to a changing economic environment, as a
consequence of the priority accorded to judicial rule making (Beck,
Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine, 2003), and a ‘political’ channel, according to
which the civil law, because of its regulatory bias, offers greater
opportunities for (inefficient) rent-seeking (Rajan and Zingales, 2003).
Legal origin theory sees a major role for the transplantation of legal norms
as a source of path dependence in institutions. Laws can be transplanted
from outside the national system concerned, by virtue of the borrowing or
copying of legislative models, compliance with international standards, or
through the imposition of laws following conquest or colonialisation. The
legal origin approach sees transplantation as an external influence on legal
development, on the basis that nearly all systems in the world have drawn
the their basic legal infrastructure from one of the original common law or
civil law models. These parent systems aside, the legal system can
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therefore be understood as having an exogenous impact on long-run
institutional development and economic growth.
One objection to the legal origin approach is that it takes an overly
mechanical view of the process of legal transplantation. It ignores the
high degree of borrowing that has gone on between systems, even before
the adoption of the principal private law codes in the civil law at the start
of the nineteenth century; all national systems are, to some degree, hybrids
which contain elements of the regulatory styles associated with the
common law and civil law families (Siems, 2007). It also overlooks
numerous example of the ‘endogenisation’ of legal rules which occurs as
part of the borrowing process; legal models which originate in a given
system can be adapted to local conditions. The adaptation process is never
complete but nor is complete rejection the norm; it may be most accurate
to speak not of ‘transplants’ but of ‘irritants’ or catalysts which may well
trigger unexpected effects in the host systems, but which are rarely
without consequences of some kind (Teubner, 2001).
A further difficulty with the legal origins approach is the somewhat oversimplified account it gives of the common law/civil law divide (see
Ahlering and Deakin, 2007). While it is the case that civilian systems do
not formally recognize case law as a source of law in the same sense as the
provisions of the private law codes, there is a long record of judicial
innovation, not least in those areas of the law which touch directly on the
business enterprise (company and labour law), in civil law systems;
conversely, a great deal of modern labour law and company law in
common law systems such as the United Kingdom and the United States is
statutory in origin. The idea that judge-made law is a ‘spontaneous order’
with adaptive properties, while the private law codes are constructivist
restatements of the law which have restricted its development, draws far
too strong a contrast between different regulatory styles. In practice, case
law is subject to litigation strategies which incorporate pressure group
activity in much the same way that legislation is (Galanter, 1974); the
difference is one of degree, if it exists at all. In all systems, rules of
legislative origin (including those originating in the private law codes,
which are perhaps not accurately characterised as statutes at all) are
subject to reinterpretation and ex-post adjustment by the courts in the light
of the disputes that come before them.
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Having said that, there are good grounds for thinking that legal origins
theory has identified in the legal system a potentially important source of
path dependence in the evolution of market economies. In a weak-form
version of the legal origin hypothesis, regulatory styles across national
systems could have an impact on the content of substantive rules and, as a
result, on economic outcomes, even if the questionable claim that the
common law is inherently more likely to generate efficient results than the
civil law is rejected. Systems theory or autopoiesis is useful here in
pointing out the nature of, and limits to, the autonomy of the legal system
with regard to the economy and to the political system (Teubner, 1993;
Luhmann, 2006). The legal system, thanks to the development of its own
distinctive discourse and processes, evolves according to an internal
dynamic, and is not simply a cipher for broader economic or political
forces. ‘Legal culture’, understood as the ingrained and often informal
processes, concepts and understandings which aid the interpretation and
application of legal rules, is a powerful force for preserving the
distinctiveness of the legal order (Legrand, 1999; for examples in the
labour law context, see Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007). To speak of legal
autonomy is not to imply that the legal system is unaffected by its wider
context. Legal norms in an area such as labour law change over time in
response, in part, to selective pressures coming from the external
environment, and can be expected to influence the economic and political
systems in their turn. The relationship between the legal and economic
systems is recursive and iterative, rather than linear, but they are not
completely sealed off from each other’s influence. Rather than speaking
of the legal system as entirely endogenous to the economy, it may be more
accurate to invoke the idea of the coevolution of economy and law.
Systemic coevolution ensures that, while the fit between systems is never
exact, some degree of correspondence or congruence can be expected to
take place over time, and for institutional complementarities to emerge.
Thus the legal system may act as an institutional ‘carrier of history’,
giving expression to conjunctions between political and economic
institutions of the kind which the comparative political economy literature
sees as a reason for the persistence of cross-national diversity (Ahlering
and Deakin, 2007).

2008]

LONG-RUN ECONOMIC IMPACT OF LABOUR LAW SYSTEMS

11

C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF VIEWING LABOUR MARKET
INSTITUTIONS AS ENDOGENOUS

How should we assess the debate about the economic impact of labour law
in the light of these observations? We are moving away from a position
which sees labour law as an exogenous interference with market relations,
to one in which labour law rules are understood as evolved responses to
coordination failures of various kinds. The evolution of labour law is a
result, in the first instance, of the internal dynamics of the legal order, but
is also broadly reflective of social practices in the areas which the law
seeks to regulate. By virtue of its separation from the economy and the
political realm, the law is never a perfect match for market conditions; it
would only be completely adaptive if it ceased to be autonomous in any
way. The separation of formal law from other social subsystems, while it
carries a cost in terms of disjunctions between law and the economy, is
also the precondition for the law’s capacity to reproduce itself and thereby
ensure the continuity of the collective learning which is embodied in legal
norms (Carvalho and Deakin, 2008).
How far, then, can the law be used as an instrument of economic change?
Here it is instructive to reflect on Teubner’s striking observation that when
the law imposes a wage freeze or (to use a more contemporary example,
perhaps) enacts an unfair dismissal law, all that has happened, in one
sense, is that there has been an internal communication from one part of
the legal system to another (Teubner, 1993). What this means is that the
legislative text itself, assuming it has been legitimately adopted, is
recognized by the legal system as having certain effects for court
judgments and rulings and associated mechanisms of legal enforcement.
For example, the legislative articulation of a standard of fairness in
dismissal has immediate repercussions for the underlying private law
norms which, in most systems, impose few such formal constraints on the
employer’s power of termination. However, this says nothing about the
implementation of the rule at the level of economic relationships. Such
implementation depends on the capacity of the economic system to
receive, de-code and implement the legal text, a process which goes on
beyond the boundaries of the legal system. In practice, employment
protection laws may be enforced and implemented by a variety of means:
the activities of labour inspectors, human resources managers and trade
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union officials; litigation and other forms of dispute resolution; the
adoption of codes of practice building on the law; the incorporation of
legal norms into standard-form contracts at firm and industry level; and so
on. The widespread acceptance of a legal rule may also come to depend
on a general understanding on the part of market actors, without the need
for specific enforcement mechanisms. However, only those legal norms
which have an especially close connection to social practice and are based
on a general consensus are likely to have this self-enforcing character.
Many labour law rules, including unfair dismissal statutes, have
distributive consequences which make them highly disputed in practice.
The effects of labour law depend, then, on the existence of processes
beyond the legal system, referred to in systems theory as mechanisms of
‘structural coupling’, which serve to translate them, however imperfectly,
into practice (Rogowski and Wilthagen, 1994).
Under these
circumstances, few a priori assumptions can be made about the impact of
labour law rules. The impact of changes in formal rules at national level
will depend on a range of factors in play at the level of the relevant
industry or firm. At the micro level, the translation process may well be
most problematic in precisely those sectors or enterprises which did not
previously observe the social norm or practice from which part of the
content of the rule is derived. The contentious application of unfair
dismissal laws, which gave expression to the employment practices of
large, bureaucratically-organised enterprises, to smaller firms and
casualised forms of work illustrates the point. At a macro level, the
impact of a labour law reform will depend on the knock-on effects upon
complementary institutions. These are not confined to institutions of the
labour market alone, but can extend to mechanisms which are closely
linked to labour law, such as product market regulation, tort law,
commercial contract law and, above all, company law and corporate
governance (Barker and Rueda, 2007).
Is this essential indeterminacy of labour law one possible reason for the
failure of empirical analyses to find a clear and consistent set of findings
concerning its economic impacts? The predicted effects of employment
protection legislation (‘EPL’) include higher unemployment as firms are
deterred from hiring, and a reduction in productivity thanks to the slowing
down of the movement of labour from less productive to more productive
firms (Saint-Paul, 1997).
On the other hand, EPL may reduce
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unemployment by making it more costly for employers to dismiss workers
in a downturn, and by providing incentives for training as a substitute for
redundancies it may enhance productivity (Koeniger, 2005). Empirically,
it has proved very hard to establish which of these effects predominates.
Econometric studies based on national-level data have not been able to
establish a clear relationship between EPL and employment. There is
some evidence that EPL stabilizes employment but also increases the
duration of unemployment; evidence that it slows down the inter-firm
movement of labour in response to demand and wage shocks is weak (see
Bertola, 2008).
A nuanced view of the effects of labour law should take into account its
selective impact; because the law is mostly concerned with extending and
standardizing existing practices, legal interventions will have most impact
on those firms and sectors which do not already follow the practices in
question, or in which the workers most directly affected by the legal
measure in question are concentrated. Taking this approach, Bassanini
and Venn (2007), in an analysis of 18 OECD countries, report a negative
relationship between EPL and labour productivity growth when ‘EPLbinding’ industries are compared to non-binding industries. They define
an EPL-binding industry as one in which firms have a higher propensity to
dismiss workers in a downturn. On the other hand, they find a positive
impact of minimum wage laws on productivity in low-paying sectors, as
well as a positive effect of parental leave laws in female-dominated
industries.
A growing number of studies are looking at possible complementarities
between labour law rules and alternative institutions including product
market regulation and corporate governance rules (Boeri, Nicoletti and
Scarpetta, 2000; Koeniger and Vindigni, 2003; Nicoletti and Scarpetta,
2003; Amable, Ersnt and Polombarini, 2005; Amable, Demmou and Gatti,
2007). Amable, Demmou and Gatti (2007), reviewing aggregate national
data from OECD countries, find evidence to suggest that product market
regulation and EPL are substitutes: deregulation in product markets
produces higher growth only in conjunction with the preservation of a high
level of EPL. Gatti (2008), conversely, finds that high EPL may be
complementary to ownership concentration of the kind associated with a
coordinated market approach to corporate governance: high ownership
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concentration has a positive impact on labour productivity when combined
with high EPL.
This type of research, then, suggests that the impact of labour law changes
must be assessed by taking into account both the uneven impacts which
labour regulation has on firms and industries, and the way in which labour
law interacts with other elements in the regulatory framework, with timeseries evidence being essential in both cases if dynamic effects are to be
captured. When this is done, the economic effects of labour laws become
certainly more complex but also, in many instances, more positive in terms
of their implications for productivity and growth, than the standard
approach implies.
For all that, the sway of the orthodox model remains strong, particularly at
the level of policy making. In 2003 the IMF called for the deregulation of
European labour markets, arguing that reforms intended to bring European
labour laws into lines with those of the US would cut unemployment by
over a third, with an even bigger reduction if they were combined with
product market deregulation (IMF, 2003). The OECD, notwithstanding
the ambivalence of some of its own empirical work on this point, has
maintained the view that the deregulatory approach of its 1994 Jobs
Strategy retains ‘plausibility’ (OECD, 2004: 165). The World Bank’s
Doing Business Report for 2008 states without equivocation that ‘laws
created to protect workers often hurt them’ and that ‘more flexible labour
regulations boost job creation’ (World Bank, 2008: 19).
The core of the problem lies in the continuing use of the assumptions of
orthodox theory to drive the analysis on which policy is based. The belief
that the labour market, if left alone, will self-correct, is not simply the
basis of the policy argument for deregulation, it also has methodological
implications: ‘adherents to the new orthodox view search the data for
specifications/measures that support their priors, while barely noticing
evidence that goes against them’ (Freeman, 2005: 10). As Freeman
suggests, one possible response to this approach is get better evidence of
how labour laws operate at firm and industry level. He also points out that
longitudinal evidence, which ‘most empiricists would regard as providing
a more valid and stronger test of any claim’, is to be preferred to the crosssectional regressions on which the current orthodoxy rests (2005: 14-15).
He also refers to the need to take into account the multiple institutional
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configurations which, in particular contexts, can alter outcomes, while also
noting the difficulties inherent in studying these interactions empirically:
there are some configurations for which no evidence is available; others
may be found to be unique to single countries; and the relatively small
number of countries for which good data exist, coupled with the slow rate
of institutional change, mean that there may be relatively few data points
compared to the number of possible institutional combinations.

D. IDENTIFYING CORE HYPOTHESES AND RELEVANT EMPIRICAL
METHODS

We can sum up the discussion so far by identifying, in general terms, some
core claims or hypotheses which come out of our theoretical review, and
considering their implications for empirical research.
A first claim might be called the indeterminacy hypothesis; in other words,
the economic effects of a given labour law reform are a priori
indeterminate. This could be for various reasons: because labour law rules
tend to emerge out of particular contexts, their effects will not be constant
across all firms or industries; the application of labour regulations is
dependent on a range of complex factors beyond the law which vary
according to sectoral and national conditions, and to the point in the
economic cycle at which legal changes are introduced; and, labour law
rules can, in principle, have both positive and negative effects, which may
offset each other. If all or some of these claims were correct, it would
only be possible to predict the impacts of labour laws if a great deal were
known about the contexts in which the relevant rules originated and in
which they were applied. In an extreme form, the argument from
indeterminacy becomes a claim about triviality: because of the
endogeneity of of its emergence and the contingency surrounding its
impact, it is unlikely that labour law can ever be a long-run causal factor
independently influencing the path of economic development; at best it
might be a cipher for other economic or institutional forces.
A second claim is the legal origins hypothesis advanced by Botero et al.
(2004) in the labour law field. As we have seen, this holds that the
content of labour law is determined to a significant degree by the legal
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origins of national systems. In the strong form of this hypothesis, the
persistent effect of legal origin is an exogenous causal factor which is
likely to lead to inefficiency, particularly in the civil law world and in
systems into which norms are transplanted through copying, colonization
of conquest. The weak-form hypothesis sees a link between legal origin
and the content of laws but is sceptical on the efficiency implications of
this.
A third claim is the complementarity hypothesis which can be derived
from the comparative political economy literature. This maintains that the
impacts of labour law rules depend upon the interaction of labour
regulation with complementary institutions operating within particular
national systems (or, by extension, at other relevant levels such as
individual industries or transnational trading blocs). In particular, labour
law rules might be expected to operate differently in liberal market
systems and coordinated market systems, respectively. This set of claims
overlaps to some degree with the other two. It shares with the
indeterminacy hypothesis the view that labour law rules are at least partly
endogenous to particular national or local contexts, without going so far as
to imply that their effects are so radically contingent, or as trivial, as the
indeterminacy approach suggests. It shares with the weak-form legal
origins hypothesis an interest in legal infrastructure as a possible causal
influence on economic development, but leaves open the possibility that
the civil law ‘regulatory style’, for example, is complementary to the
wider context of the coordinated market systems in which it mostly
applies, and so compatible with efficiency (contrary to the strong-form
legal origins hypothesis).
To test these claims, a more thorough empirical understanding of how
legal systems operate is needed. As we have seen, the empirical literature
is moving in the direction of studies which take into account a range of
contextual effects relevant to the emergence and application of legal rules.
There is also general agreement on the need to have better time-series
data. It is with these points in mind that we now turn to have a closer look
at recent developments in the evidence base relating to legal systems.
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III. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE EVOLUTION OF LABOUR
LAW SYSTEMS

A. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN LEGAL INDEX CONSTRUCTION
A number of studies have recently developed measures of the intensity of
labour regulation which have been used in cross-national empirical studies
to estimate the impact of the law. One of the first of these was the
OECD’s EPL strictness indicator. This adapts an index first constructed
by Grubb and Wells (1993). The index consists, in the first instance, of 18
items, which are grouped into three categories: rules affecting the
dismissal of workers with ‘regular contracts’, a term which refers to
contracts of employment of indeterminate duration; rules relating to fixedterm and temporary (agency) contracts; and regulations, over and above
those in the first two categories, governing collective dismissals. The
information contained in the 18 items is drawn, in the first instance, from
accounts of the formal laws in force in 28 OECD member states. Scores
are assigned on a number of bases, which include the length of time it
takes to give notice of dismissal and the number of months of mandated
severance pay; in other cases, ordinal scales are used, for example, to
indicate the strictness of the legal tests for judging the fairness of
dismissal. The scores are standardized and expressed on a scale from 0 to
6, with 6 representing maximum strictness. Once the values for individual
variables are set in this way, they are aggregated into a smaller number of
units, which are weighted and combined again to form three indicators
representing the strictness of regulation of regular contracts, temporary
contracts and collective dismissals. Finally, an overall indicator of
strictness for each country is arrived by combining the three main
indicators, with collective dismissals weighted at 40% of the other two (on
the basis that this indicator covers rules operating over and above those
which are captured by the first two indicators).
The data contained in the OECD index cover three points in time,
corresponding to the three main data-gathering exercises which the OECD
has conducted: the late 1980s, the late 1990s, and 2003. The collective
dismissals indicator was only introduced in the 1999 exercise, so two
versions of the overall indicator exist: version 1, covering the rules
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governing regular and temporary contracts only (without the rules on
collective dismissals), goes back to the first exercise in the 1980s, while
version 2, with the addition of the collective dismissal rules, only covers
the last two exercises. A detailed account of the laws in force in 2003 has
been provided and justifications offered for the scores arrived at. Changes
in the law which took place in between the three main data gathering
exercises have also been collected, so that it becomes possible to construct
an annual time series.
The authors of the OECD index accept that it suffers from limitations
which are ‘inherent to most synthetic indices’ and which include
‘problems of subjectivity, the difficulty of attributing scores on the basis
of legal provisions that may be applied differently in practice, and the
choice of the weighting scheme used to calculate the summary indicator
form from the various sub-components’ (OECD, 2004: 99). Steps have
been taken to address some of these issues, but some remain intractable.
The index takes into account, for example, benefits set out in collective
agreements and contractual practices which are widely followed in some
countries, such as Japan, where their operation is well documented, but for
some countries there are no reliable data on these issues. The role of
judicial interpretation is also noted along with aspects of court procedure
which can affect the enforcement of rights. Evidence on court practice has
been collated and is reflected in the scores given to some of the variables
on unfair dismissal remedies (OECD, 2004: 66).
Some patterns emerge from the OECD data on the state of the law. There
is a wide variation across countries which is mainly accounted for by
differences in the regulation of temporary and fixed-term contracts; there
has, however, been a degree of convergence since the early 1990s, largely
as a result of deregulation, although this has been limited. The rankings of
countries has changed very little over time, with the so-called AngloSaxon systems having the lowest scores, those in southern Europe having
the highest, with the northern European and Nordic systems in the middle.
Cross-sectional, bivariate analyses reported in the 2004 OECD
Employment Outlook indicate a link between EPL strictness, as measured
by the OECD index, and flows into and out of unemployment, although
the association is weak (in relation to the 2003 data gathering exercise the
relationship between EPL strictness and flows out of unemployment is
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negative but not statistically significant). There is no consistent
relationship either way with unemployment. The 2004 Employment
Outlook accepts that bivariate and time-specific analyses of this kind can
only provide limited information and should not be used to guide policy.
It therefore reports additional tests which take advantage of the time series
of EPL strictness which has been constructed in the way just described.
When this is done, a correlation between EPL and higher unemployment is
established, and there is evidence of a negative impact of EPL on
unemployment flows. The changes in EPL which took place over the
course of the 1990s, which mainly consisted of relaxations to the laws
governing temporary and fixed-term work, are correlated with an increase
in the adoption of temporary and fixed-term contracts (OECD, 2004: 79).
The other main indicator of labour regulation which is currently in use is
the ‘employing workers index’ of the World Bank, which is published
annually in its Doing Business reports. This builds on the labour
regulation index drawn up by Botero et al. (2004) and is one of the series
of indicators developed by the members of legal origin school. The index
prepared by Botero et al. has a wider scope than the EPL strictness
indicator as it covers not just employment protection but other areas of
labour law, including strike law and the law of employee representation, as
well as aspects of social security legislation, including unemployment
insurance. It also extends to a wider range of both developed and
developing countries. The index contains over 100 indicators each of
which is defined according to an algorithm which sets out the basis for the
coding. The resulting scores (which are mostly expressed on a zero to 1
scale) are normalized and averaged to produce composite variables on
particular areas of law. For example, the indicator ‘cost of firing workers’
is built up from six sub-units which code the law on such matters as the
mandated length of notice period, the mandated severance pay, and so on.
The resulting composite variable measures the cost of firing 20 per cent of
the firm’s workforce, ‘10% for redundancy and 10% without cause’. The
following assumptions are made:
‘The cost of firing a worker is calculated as the sum of the
notice period, severance pay, and any mandatory penalties
established by law or mandatory collective agreements for
a worker with three years of tenure with the firm. If
dismissal is illegal, we set the cost of firing equal to the
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annual wage. The new wage bill incorporates the normal
wage of the remaining workers and the cost of firing
workers. The cost of firing workers is computed as the
ratio of the new wage bill to the old one.’ (Botero et al.,
2004)
This variable is then aggregated with others (‘alternative employment
contracts’, ‘cost of increasing hours’ and ‘dismissal procedures’) to
produce a single indicator for ‘employment laws’. Similar procedures are
used to arrive at scores for ‘collective relations laws’ and ‘social security
laws’. The three sub-indices can then be combined to produce a single
country score.
The Botero et al. index simply cites as its main source ‘the laws of each
country’. A number of more specific sources of general relevance to
labour law are referred to, including legal encyclopaedias and
compendiums of social security laws, but, in contrast to the OECD’s index
of EPL strictness, no explanations are given for the values attributed to the
basic informational units at country level. The index is purely crosssectional: it reports the state of the law at a loosely-defined point in the
late 1990s.
The main finding of the analysis carried out by Botero et al. (2004) was
that labour regulation is highly correlated with legal origin, with systems
in the French civil law family having the highest scores and those in the
English common law family the lowest. On the basis of cross-sectional
bivariate analyses the study also reports negative impacts of labour
regulation. Higher scores on the index are correlated with lower male
employment, higher youth unemployment, and a larger informal economy.
However, the correlations are not consistently strong or significant (see
Pozen, 2006, for a critique). Because the index is cross-sectional, it
cannot be used to study the effects of changes in labour law regulation
over time, nor can it capture dynamic interaction effects of the kind
hypothesized in the comparative political economy literature.
The World Bank’s employing workers index adopts the methodology of
Botero et al. (2004) but has a somewhat different content. It is built up
from three sub-indices: a ‘rigidity of employment index’, an index of nonwage labour costs, and one which measures firing costs. The rigidity of
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employment index contains sub-indices, covering ‘difficulty of hiring’,
‘rigidity of hours’ and ‘difficulty of firing’. These are broken down again,
so that the difficulty of hiring index, for example, measures ‘(i) whether
fixed-term contracts are prohibited for permanent tasks; (ii) the maximum
cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts; and (iii) the ratio of the
minimum wage for a trainee or first-time employee to the average value
per worker’. As in the original Botero et al. study, definitions of the base
units are set out and protocols established for coding. Values are
expressed as scores between 0 and 100, with 100 representing ‘more rigid
regulation’. Countries are ranked on the basis of their scores.
The sources on which the index is based are stated to be ‘a detailed survey
of employment regulations that is completed by local lawyers and public
officials’; laws, regulations and secondary sources ‘are reviewed to ensure
accuracy’ (World Bank, 2008). The index is in the form of a time series
which is updated each year; it begins in 2004, taking advantage of the
regular survey administered by the World Bank, but there has been no
attempt to code laws further back than this.
A principal feature of the World Bank index, building on Botero et al.
(2004), is that while it is based largely on textual evidence of formal laws,
supplemented by survey results on perceptions of regulatory stringency, it
tries to capture actual costs as they impact on firms. More precisely, the
evaluations of the effects of laws are assumed to measure their impact on a
particular category of worker (a middle-aged, male, full-time employee
with 20 years service in the same company earning the company’s average
wage and not a member of a trade union, unless membership is
mandatory) and a particular type of firm (which among other things is a
limited liability company located in the country’s capital city, 100%
domestically owned and employing just over 200 employees (World
Bank, 2008b)). These may, in a sense, be ‘standard’ cases as they
represent the contexts to which labour law regulations most easily apply
and for which many of them were initially designed. However, they are
not in any sense representative cases, particularly in many developing
countries where only a small proportion of the overall working population
will fit this description. But even in developed systems where ‘standard’
work in large manufacturing firms remains widespread, World Bank index
will not capture the extent to which labour law rules are modulated in
other contexts, such as those involving small and medium-sized
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enterprises. The World Bank index has chosen to focus not on an average
case but on one in which the law is at its most protective or, in the World
Bank’s own terms, most ‘rigid’ (Berg and Cazes, 2007; Lee and McCann,
2007). It cannot even be assumed that, in the ‘standard cases’ on which
the employing workers index is based, an accurate assessment of actual
costs can be gauged from the combination of legal texts and survey
evidence on which the index relies. The index is based on the assumption
that the firm in question ‘abides by every law and regulation but does not
grant workers more benefits than mandated by law, regulation or (if
applicable) collective bargaining agreement’ (World Bank, 2008b). Thus
no account is taken of the degree to which the ‘standard’ firm already
observes the standards set out in the law, or, in practice, exceeds them.
‘Standard’ firms are precisely those which are most likely to do both. For
these various reasons, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the World
Bank index is not, as it purports to be, a measure of actual costs.

B. NEW TIME SERIES EVIDENCE: THE CBR INDICES ON
SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION, CREDITOR RIGHTS AND LABOUR
REGULATION

A set of longitudinal indices on the evolution of company, insolvency and
labour law has been developed over the past three years by a team of
economists and lawyers at the Centre for Business Research (‘CBR’) in
Cambridge. The aim of this project has been (among other things) to
examine the claims of the legal origin hypothesis, using time series
evidence. The nature of the CBR datasets will now be briefly explained;
more complete accounts are available elsewhere and the reader is referred
to these papers (see Lele and Siems, 2007; Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007;
Armour et al., 2007) and to the project home page, where the indices are
available
on
line
(http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm), for a
fuller explanation.
The CBR datasets cover the development of the law in five countries
(France, Germany, India, the UK and the US) over the period 1970-2005
using a wide range of indicators which are intended to provide a
comprehensive map of the law in the areas under review. Datasets have
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also been constructed for a larger number of countries over a shorter
period of time (1995-2006), focusing on a sub-sample of legal variables
which is weighted so as to capture the state of the law in undergoing the
most rapid change. In this paper we will focus on the datasets covering
the longer period, and look at the experience of the four developed
systems in the sample, namely France, Germany, the UK and the US.1
The CBR’s labour regulation dataset draws on methods first used in the
OECD and World Bank studies, but modifies them in ways which are
intended to address some of the methodological problems which were
encountered in the construction of those datasets. The CBR index for
labour regulation contains 40 basic variables which are aggregated into
five areas: alternative employment contracts, regulation of working time,
regulation of dismissal, employee representation, and industrial action. As
in the case of the Botero et al. index, an algorithm is prepared setting out
the definition of each variable and the approach to the way the law of each
country is coded; as with the OECD, detailed explanations are given of the
basis for the codings, and the legal sources relied on are fully set out.
These are the primary legal sources, rather than the summary descriptions
of legal rules provided by the OECD.
The CBR index differs from its predecessors in two main respects. Firstly,
it aims to reflect the systemic nature of legal rules, that is, the sense in
which the function of a given legal rule alters according to the nature of its
structural relationship to other legal and non-legal rules in a given national
context. While, in broad terms, legal rules relating to the business
enterprise can be understood to perform certain functions of general
relevance in market economies, across national systems it is by no means
the case that the same formal rule always performs the same function. The
relevant rule can often be found outside the legal system altogether. It
follows that when thinking about rules as functional equivalents, it is
necessary to look beyond the formal law (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998). Thus
the CBR index takes into account collective agreements and, in the case of
the shareholder protection index, corporate governance codes of practice,
1

The CBR dataset also covers India (see Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007). India
raises special considerations when analysing the economic impact of legal rules,
because of the issue of the enforcement of labour laws, and the large informal
sector. Accordingly we leave the analysis of the Indian case for future research.
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in addition to formal legal rules, where they can be considered as
functional equivalents to legal rules. An example of this is the coding of
sector level collective agreements on working time in the UK which,
thanks to the equivalent of extension legislation, operated as a de facto
floor of rights up to the 1980s, when this form of statutory prop for
collective bargaining was withdrawn and the collective agreements
themselves began to break up. Secondly, and relatedly, the CBR index
attempts to capture variations in the degree of bindingness of legal rules.
Specifically, this means taking into account the form of labour law rules,
many of which are not mandatory at all but operate as default rules which
can be varied by individual or collective agreement. The index also seeks
to capture the extent to which labour standards can be modified for
particular types of enterprise or work relationship. On the whole,
graduated variables are preferred to simple binary scores of dummy
variables.
To illustrate in more detail the way in which the index was constructed,
the Appendix sets out the part of it which refers to dismissal laws in the
United Kingdom. This sub-index on the regulation of dismissal contains
nine variables, which cover matters ranging from the rules on legally
mandated minimum notice periods to the law governing priority in reemployment. The Table sets out the algorithm according to which each
variable is defined, the score given to the law for each year in the period
covered by the index, and the explanation for the coding. The complete
codings, covering all forty variables for the full range of years and
countries in the dataset, may be consulted online.2
It follows from the account of the construction of the index which has just
been given that it does not purport to estimate the actual impact of labour
law rules on a representative enterprise. As we have seen, attempts to do
this run up against some fundamental difficulties which are likely to
render the results excessively artificial. The CBR index sets out, more
straightforwardly, to measure the extent of regulation, understood as the
degree to which a rule protects the interests of workers as opposed to those
of employers, using as a benchmark a scale set out in an algorithm
developed for this purpose.

2

See http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm.
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Does this not produce an even more artificial set of results than those of
the World Bank, which at least attempt to get beyond the formal legal
rules by incorporating estimates of actual costs and which incorporate the
possibility of non-enforcement by obtaining survey evidence on
perceptions of regulation? Our response to this point is that it is preferable
not to try to measure actual costs at enterprise level by means of a
synthetic index of this kind: it is better to accept that this is impossible
given the wide range of contexts in which labour law rules apply and the
multiplicity of factors through which formal rules are mediated when they
are observed and applied at micro level. Moreover, having an index of
formal rules does not rule out taking steps to look at actual effects. It is
possible to control for the non-application of laws in practice, or for their
non-enforcement, by using measures of institutional effectiveness such as
the World Bank’s rule of law index (see Armour et al., 2007).
Alternatively, indices based on the formal strength of laws can be
amended in the light of evidence of their implementation, as in the case of
the index of the effective observance of working time laws constructed by
Lee and McCann (2007). At the same time, having a measure of the
formal law which is not, in itself, qualified by issues of enforcement, can
be useful for other purposes, for example in seeing to what extent formal
legal changes are correlated with ‘upstream’ influences on the political
process such as interest group coalitions or macroeconomic shocks.
In the case of the four countries studied here, all of which are developed
economies with well functioning legal systems, it may be assumed that
labour laws are, on the whole, well observed. This is not to say that
enforcement is always effective or that it is entirely uniform across these
four systems, or within each of them; however, any enforcement
difficulties are of a different order to those affecting some developing
systems for which it would be appropriate to make use of indices which
seek to capture the effectiveness of the legal system.
A further feature of the CBR index is that, in its construction, no prior
assumptions, positive or negative, are made about the impacts of legal
rules. It seeks to be a pure measure of the content of the rule which does
not assume that the law necessarily imposes on employers net ‘costs’ or
‘rigidities’, to use the language of the World Bank, or that increasing
regulation is necessarily associated with increasing ‘strictness’, as the
OECD puts it. As we have seen, labour law rules can have positive
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economic effects, and employers, as well as workers, may benefit from the
use of the law to solve collective action and coordination problems. In
case of the OECD and World Bank scales, it is assumed that a higher score
necessarily equates to an undesirable outcome for the employer, and a
lower score to a better outcome. The highest score is assumed to be the
worst possible outcome for the employer and the lowest score the best.
No such assumption is made in the CBR scales: it is possible to have too
high, but also too low a level of regulation, for both employers and
workers. The precise level of the ‘optimal’ score is not known a priori, on
the basis that it will most likely differ from system to system, and that it is
the purpose of the index to chart this variation as far as possible.
The World Bank index has been criticized because its indicators ‘do not
consider the positive externalities of labour regulations’ (Berg and Cazes,
2007: 6). The algorithms used by the World Bank studies repeatedly refer
to ‘costs’ and ‘rigidities’ being imposed on employers as a result of
regulation, and nowhere refer to potential benefits. In itself, this might not
prevent the index being shown to be correlated to positive outcome
variables; the same point applies to the OECD index. The issue is
whether, given their theoretical priors, these indices exhibit a systematic
bias in their choice of variables and weightings which make such a result
unlikely. This is not altogether clear; in its favour, the Botero et al. index
correlates well with evidence of the perceptions of the strength of labour
law regulation drawn from a large-scale survey which included trade
union officials and labour law academics as well as employers (Chor and
Freeman, 2005). Perhaps the best that can be said is that given the
theoretical assumptions driving this index, it is noteworthy that its
empirical analysis does not give a very clear picture of the supposed
negative effects of labour law (see Pozen, 2006).
The CBR index does not solve all the problems associated with index
construction. Every index contains an implicit weighting, in so far as a
decision has to be taken either to weight each variable equally, or to alter
the weighting to reflect a view of their comparative importance. This can
be done country by country, given that it is unlikely, in principle, that the
same law has the same systemic importance in each system;
codetermination laws, for example, might be thought to play a pivotal role
in Germany which would justify weighting employee representation
scores more heavily in an overall assessment of the intensity of labour law
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regulation in that country than would be the case in France or the UK (see
Ahlering and Deakin, 2007). While weighting of this kind can be done,
we have chosen not to weight the variables in the CBR index for the
purposes of the present analysis, largely because it is not clear that this can
be done on an objectively verifiable basis (see the discussion in Deakin,
Lele and Siems, 2007). The OECD’s EPL strictness indicator uses
weightings extensively when aggregating the individual informational
units into composite indicators; many of weightings are not explained and
not self-evidently justified. Botero et al. (2004), by contrast, make no
attempt at a priori weightings, and we follow their approach here.
As we have seen, all synthetic indices of this type involve some degree of
subjective judgment on the scores attributed to particular variables. The
issue is not whether each individual score is beyond dispute, since there
will always be some scope for disagreement among legal scholars and
others about the precise value to be attributed to a given variable, but
whether the coding is consistent across countries and across time
(Spamann, 2007; Berg and Cazes, 2007). This means constructing the
variables so as to avoid selection biases which might, for example, skew
the outcomes either for or against a particular system. It is possible, for
example, that the CBR labour regulation index suffers from a countryspecific bias, in so far as the inclusion of variables on the equal treatment
of part-time and temporary work reflect laws of the kind which are found
in European Union countries (thanks in part to individual country
traditions and also to the harmonizing impact of EU directives) but
virtually nowhere else, and in particular not in the US case. We have
sought to mitigate this problem by defining the relevant variables in
functional, country-neutral terms, and in judging how far, from the
operation of other forms of regulation such as laws governing basic labour
standards, US law permits the differential treatment of part-time or fixedterm workers. It is also possible to object to the CBR index on the
grounds that the choice of variables will, in and of itself, unduly depress
the US score, simply because of the absence of unjust dismissal legislation
in that system. This is undeniably a problem, but another way of looking
at the issue is simply to accept that US laws on employment at will, by
their nature, imply a much lower score on these variables than the scores
for the European countries in the sample.
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C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF LABOUR
REGULATION

It is now time to turn to the analysis. What can we learn from a first look
at the long-term time series provided by the CBR datasets?
We first look at the degree of covariance in the level of protection across
the four countries and the extent of their divergence or convergence over
time. Figure 1 indicates that France and Germany had a considerably
higher degree of regulation than the other two systems throughout the
period in question. Legal origin also seems to make a difference. As
Table 1, Part I shows, the difference between the common law systems
and the rest was substantial and statistically significant in respect of the
index as a whole and each of its main component parts.
In itself, this does not establish that legal infrastructure is responsible for
diversity of practice. It is not possible directly to observe aspects of legal
infrastructure, such as the respective role of courts and legislatures, in the
dataset. The observed divergence may be compatible with the weak-form
legal origins effect, in which legal systems serve as ‘carriers of history’ to
perpetuate institutional complementarities arising at national level, but are
not themselves the root cause of such conjunctions (Ahlering and Deakin,
2007).
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Figure 1
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Table 1
Regression Analysis of Labour Regulation in Four OECD Countries since
1970

Series
I. Panel Data
Analysis1
(i) All (RE)
(ii) Alternative
employment
contracts (RE)
(iii) Regulation of

a

Eng

t

R-Sq

0.64***
0.74***

-0.43**
-0.5***

0.83
0.76

0.66***

-0.5***

0.86
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working time (RE)
(iv) Regulation of
dismissal (FE)
(v) Employee
representation
(RE)
(vi) Industrial
action (RE)
II. Trend
Analysis of
Coefficients of
Variation2
(i ) All [AR (1)]
(ii) Alternative
employment
contracts [AR (1)]
(iii) Regulation of
working time [AR
(1)]
(iv) Regulation of
dismissal [AR (1)]
(v) Employee
representation
[AR (1)]
(vi) Industrial
action [AR (1)]
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0.57***

-0.34***

0.5

0.61***

-0.45***

0.73

0.62***

-0.38***

0.53

70.004***
84.67***

-0.02
-0.84**

0.79
0.82

68.51***

0.8

0.81

90.64***

-1.36***

0.64

62.38

0.94

0.84

53.43***

0.72*

0.85

***
**
*

Significant at 1 per cent level.
Significant at 5 per cent level.
Significant at 10 per cent level.

1

The following panel regression has been fitted:
Y = a + b.Eng

where Y is the series on legal protection , Eng = 1 for UK and USA and = 0 for
France and Germany. Results reported here are either based on the random
effects (RE) or fixed effects (FE) model depending on the outcome of BreuschPagan test. The particular model used is referred to in parentheses. In each case
both the models give more or less the same result.
2

The following trend regression has been fitted:
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Y = a + b.t
where Y is the series on coefficient of variation in different aspects of legal
protection in two legal groups – English Law and Civil Law – and t is the time
trend. The procedure for arriving at the estimates is referred to in each column; it
is AR (1), decided on the basis of Lagrange multiplier test of autocorrelation.
Source: CBR Labour Regulation Dataset (Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007;
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm).

If we were observing the strong-form legal origin effect, we would expect
it to be a consistently powerful constraint on convergence. We do not
observe a time-invariant effect of this kind. The overall picture is one of
convergence between common law and civil law systems during the
1970s, followed by sharp divergence in the early 1980s and some
convergence again in the following years (see Figure 2). More formally,
Table 1, Part II reports the findings of a trend analysis (taking into account
the problem of auto-correlated residuals) of the time series of the
coefficients of variation (standard deviations as percentages of the mean)
in the different components of the index, breaking down the sample of
countries by legal origin (English law and civil law). Changes in the
coefficient of variation over time can be used to provide a measure of the
extent of convergence and divergence between systems, with a lower score
indicating greater convergence. The evidence in Figure 2 and Table 1
show that there is no statistically significant converging trend for the
aggregate index over the whole period of our study. This is also true of
the sub-indices for regulation of working time employee representation:
these show a once-and-for-all diverging jump in the early 1980s and a
slow trend to convergence in the early 2000s. However, regulations on
alternative employment contracts and regulation of dismissal show
statistically significant converging trends. The sub-index on the regulation
of industrial action shows divergence since the early 1980s and a more
recent tendency towards convergence; across the entire period, there is an
overall diverging trend which is barely statistically significant (see Table
1, Part II, rows i-vi).
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Figure 2
Common Law (UK and US) vs. Civil Law (France and Germany): Coefficients of
Variation in Aggregate Labour Regulation,1970-2006
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Source: CBR Labour Regulation dataset (Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007;
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm).

There is then, some support for the legal origin hypothesis, but it is
qualified. Unlike the cases of the law governing shareholder protection
and creditor rights, where analysis of the equivalent CBR datasets reveal
no clear pattern of regulation at all by reference to the common law or
civil law divide (see Armour et al., 2008), here there is one. Legal origin
therefore appears to matter for labour law in a way it does not for
company law and insolvency law. However, when we look more closely
at the labour law findings, the picture gets cloudier. There is some
evidence of convergence, legal origin notwithstanding, in the areas of
dismissal law and the regulation of the law governing alternative contracts
of employment. This represents the partial convergence of British labour
law on the unfair dismissal model which is, historically, much more
deeply rooted in the experience of the civil law countries, France and, in
particular, Germany. The UK adopted unfair dismissal for the first time in
the early 1970s, and since the mid-1970s has more or less kept intact this
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form of regulation.3 Weakening of the legislation in the mid-1980s
reflects the lengthening of qualifying periods and related changes to the
coverage of the law, but this trend was reversed in the 1990s, when EU
law led to the removal of hours thresholds which discriminated against
part-time workers. Since the mid-1990s there has been a considerable
alignment of UK practice on the regulation of alternative forms of the
employment contract, which has come about thanks to the adoption of the
EU directives on the rights of part-time and fixed-term contract workers.
Common law legal origin did not prevent the UK from adjusting to a type
of legislation which had continental European origins. The initial impetus
for this process did not come from the EU; the UK first adopted unfair
dismissal legislation in 1971, under a Conservative government, and at a
point when there were no European directives in force on labour law
issues. There still is no directive requiring general unfair dismissal
legislation across the EU. The rapprochement of UK law with European
standards on flexible forms of employment which has taken place since
the mid-1990s is the result of the implementation of EU directives, as is
the revival of working time regulation, which nevertheless remains below
the level which prevailed at the end of the 1970s when sector collective
agreements on working hours were still in force. Notwithstanding some
limitations in the UK model, its framework of individual employment law
is now significantly closer to that of Germany and France than it was a
decade ago. There remains a much more substantial gap in relation to
collective labour law. Since the mid-1990s the closed shop has not
returned nor have there been major changes in strike law (aside from a
strengthening of the right not to be dismissed when taking lawful strike
action); there has, however, been some strengthening of the law governing
employee representation, as a result, again, of the implementation in the
UK of EU directives in this area.
The role of political shifts in the development of the law can be seen from
the data. The big jump in the regulation of dismissal law, working time
and employee representation which occurred in France in the early 1980s
3

As noted above, full details on this and other aspects of changes in labour law
in the four countries concerned set out in the text are available on the CBR
website
along
with
the
dataset:
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm.
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took place under the Auroux laws of the first Mitterand government. At
the same point, the Thatcher government was removing working time
controls and reversing legislation supporting the closed shop and the right
to strike, although it made hardly any changes to unfair dismissal law.
This turning point aside, it is hard to point to strong political pressures as
the cause of change. Conservative French governments throughout the
period under review have made little impact on the high level of labour
law regulation achieved by the 1980s reforms; changes to working time
legislation, for example, have been relatively minor, and have mostly
taken the form of converting mandatory standards into default rules and
extending the role of collective bargaining at the expense of binding
legislation. In Germany, there has been a high level of political consensus
across the period as a whole. The limited deregulation of aspects of
dismissal law which was part of the Hartz reforms of the 2000s was
brought about by a social democratic-led administration. All this suggests
that when partisan politics directly influences the direction of legal
change, it tends to do so through once-and-for-all adjustments of the kind
experienced in Britain and France in the early 1980s; the more normal
pattern is one of cross-party consensus on labour law matters.
The level of protection for workers provided by US law during the period
is not only well below that of the other three countries; it is also relatively
unchanging. This does not necessarily represent a political consensus on
labour law matters, but it does reflect the logjam on legislative reform
which has operated at federal level. The scores in the index were not
altered to reflect changes in the law governing employment at will in some
states. In principle, changes in the law at state level can be captured in the
dataset if they are significantly widespread and affect more populous
states (see Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007). However, the changes which
took place were negligible when set against the much more rigorous legal
standards governing termination of employment in Europe. Thus they are
not regarded as significantly affecting the national picture.4
4

In this regard, we take the same view as the authors of the OECD EPL
strictness indicator, and Botero et al. 2004. It is arguable that we should take into
account the likelihood that the proportion of American workers covered by a justcause provision of some kind is as high as 34% once collective agreements in
both the public and private sector are taken into account, along with contractual
provisions governing termination (Verkerke, 2008). However, these agreements

2008]

LONG-RUN ECONOMIC IMPACT OF LABOUR LAW SYSTEMS

35

What can we say about the economic impacts of legal change? It is
possible to undertake a time series analysis, looking at the relationship
between changes in the values in the legal time series, with long-run
movements in employment, productivity and redistribution. The results
are set out in Table 2.
Table 2
Labour Regulation, Employment, Real Output and Wage Share in Four
OECD Countries, 1971-2006: Regression Analysis
Dependent
Variables/
Countries/

-: Regressors: -

a
(intercept)

DLRDGP
(real GDP
growth rate)

LR
(Labour
Law
Index)

Adj.
R2

DurbinWatson
Statistic

0.65
0.18
0.48
0.51

1.86
2.22
2.15
2.06

0.67

1.85

Process♥

(A) Growth of
Civil
Employment
(DLN)

France
Germany1
UK
USA

-0.02
-0.21
-0.004
0.04**

0.36***
1.31***
0.37***
0.11***

France

-0.12***

0.35***

ALL
(variables 1 to
40)
0.02
0.34
-0.003
-0.21
Alternative
employment
contracts
(variables 1 to 8)
0.008

and provisions mostly operate at individual employer level; they are not the result
of legally-binding multi-employer agreements which, in the case of UK working
time regulation up to the late 1970s, could be regarded as the functional
equivalent of legislation, and were coded accordingly.

AR (1)
OLS
AR (2)
AR (1)

AR (1)
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Germany1
UK

-0.26
-0.007

1.31***
0.37***

France
Germany1
UK

-0.13**
-0.19
-0.003

0.36***
1.34***
0.37***

France
Germany1
UK
USA

-0.01
-0.05
-0.02
0.02***

0.35***
1.28***
0.4***
0.09

France
Germany1
UK

-0.02*
-0.36
-0.001

0.35***
1.23***
0.36***

France
Germany1
UK
(B) Growth of

-0.14
0.12
0.0001

0.35***
1.24***
0.36***

0.33
0.01
Regulation of
working time
(variables 9 to
15)
0.17**
0.31
-0.008
Regulation of
dismissal
(variables 16 to
24)
0.002
0.07
0.03
-0.05***
Employee
representation
(variables 25 to
31)
0.02
0.5
-0.01
Industrial action
(variables 32 to
40)
0.16
-0.33
-0.01

[VOL. 04 NO. 06

0.2
0.51

2.23
2.16

OLS
AR (2)

0.69
0.18
0.5

1.89
2.21
2.15

AR (1)
OLS
AR (2)

0.64
0.17
0.51
0.51

1.89
2.2
2.15
2.06

AR (1)
OLS
AR (2)
AR (1)

0.66
0.18
0.5

1.81
2.26
2.16

AR (1)
OLS
AR (2)

0.65
0.2
0.5

1.81
2.26
2.16

AR (1)
OLS
AR (2)

0.35
0.11
0.3
0.17

2.08
1.52
1.77
1.56

OLS
OLS
AR(1)
OLS

0.34
0.05

2.09
1.48

OLS
OLS

Labour
Productivity
(LBPRD)

France2
Germany1
UK
USA2

0.42
-26.54
2.67
-4.98

78.27***
58.32
102.82***
56.62**

France2
Germany1

1.26
-0.26

75.29***
47.66*

ALL
(1 to 40)
3.27
50.08
14.49
48.47*
Alternative
employment
contracts
(variables 1 to 8)
0.99
2.95
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UK

2.23

103.34**

France2
Germany
UK

-7.17
-23.65**
1.54

75.07***
62.41**
104.06**

France2
Germany1
UK
USA2

0.56
-8.64**
1.48
0.39

77.39***
59.9**
103.12***
56.62**

France2
Germany1
UK

0.93
18.44
1.56

74.41***
47.14*
103.21***

France2
Germany
UK

-8.77
10.33
0.66

73.22***
47.29*
103.59**

-3.57
Regulation of
working time
(variables 9 to
15)
13.13
43.84***
1.59
Regulation
of
dismissal
(variables 16 to
24)
1.95
23.1**
0.38
10.74*
Employee
representation
(variables 25 to
31)
2.06
24.22
-0.82
Industrial action
(variables 32 to
40)
13.13
19.77
1.79

37

0.31

1.76

AR(1)

0.35
0.17
0.29

2.07
1.64
1.76

OLS
OLS
AR (1)

0.34
0.18
0.29
0.17

2.01
1.63
1.75
1.56

OLS
OLS
AR (1)
OLS

0.34
0.06
0.29

2.07
1.55
1.76

OLS
OLS
AR (1)

0.33
0.08
0.29

2.06
1.56
1.75

OLS
OLS
AR(1)

0.97
0.94
0.64
0.65

1.93
1.75
1.95
1.73

AR (2)
AR (2)
AR (2)
AR (1)

0.97
0.94
0.64

1.9
1.76
1.96

AR (2)
AR (2)
AR (2)

(C)Wage
Share(WGSH)

France
Germany1
UK
USA2

0.7***
0.68***
0.69***
0.7***

-0.21***
-0.2***
-0.24***
-0.14***

France
Germany1
UK

0.72***
0.73***
0.69***

-0.21***
-0.2***
-0.24***

ALL
(1 to 40)
0.04
0.05
-0.01
-0.19
Alternative
employment
contracts
(variables 1 to 8)
0.01
-0.03
-0.004
Regulation of
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France
Germany1
UK

0.75***
0.68***
0.69***

-0.2***
-0.19***
-0.25***

France
Germany1
UK
USA2

0.71**
0.73***
0.69***
0.69***

-0.19***
-0.19***
-0.24***
-0.14***

France
Germany1
UK

0.73***
0.57***
0.69***

-0.2***
-0.23***
-0.24***

France
Germany1
UK

0.64***
0.62***
0.69***

-0.21***
-0.21***
-0.24***

***
**
*

Significant at the 1 per cent level.
Significant at the 5 per cent level.
Significant at the 10 per cent level.

♥

The fitted equation is

working time
(variables 9 to
15)
-0.02
0.04
0.01
Regulation
of
dismissal
(variables 16 to
24)
0.02
-0.05
-0.01
-0.04
Employee
representation
(variables 25 to
31)
-0.004
0.19
-0.01
Industrial action
(variables 32 to
40)
0.11
0.21
0.003

Y= a + b. DLRGDP + c.LR
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0.97
0.94
0.64

1.87
1.76
1.97

AR (2)
AR (2)
AR (2)

0.97
0.94
0.64
0.65

1.94
1.74
1.96
1.73

AR (2)
AR (2)
AR (2)
AR (1)

0.97
0.94
0.64

1.87
1.72
1.94

AR (2)
AR (2)
AR (2)

0.97
0.94
0.64

1.88
1.73
1.96

AR (2`)
AR (2)
AR (2)

(1)

where Y is the dependent variable, the growth rate of civil employment, DLN or the
growth of labour productivity (LBPRD) or the wage share in total economy (WGSH),
DLRGDP is the growth rate of real GDP (RGDP), LR is the labour regulation index
(aggregate or its different components taken one at a time), a, b and c are regression
parameters. This equation is fitted on the ordinary least squares (OLS) basis and a
twelve order Lagrange Multiplier Test is conducted to ascertain the order of
autocorrelation of the residuals. To tackle the problem of autocorrelation (if any), the
Exact Newton-Raphson Iterative Method was used to estimate the parameters. The choice
between AR (1) and AR (2) is done on the basis of the log-likelihood ratio tests of
AR(1) versus OLS and AR(2) versus AR(1).
Notes:
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The period of study starts from 1972 (due to lack of data).
The period of study ends at 2005 (due to lack of data).

Sources: CBR Labour Regulation Dataset (Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007;
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm); OECD
(OECD’s iLibrary); International Monetary Fund, International Financial
Statistics 2008.

Data on civil employment are available from the OECD (the OECD
iLibrary) and data on real GDP are available from the IMF (International
Financial Statistics). To avoid the problem of non-stationarity5 we take the
first log-difference of the two series; these give us the annual growth rates
of employment and real output (respectively) over the period 1971-2006.
We then fit the following regression, with a time trend:
DLN = a + b.DLRDGP + c.LR

(1)

DLN is the growth rate of employment, DLRDGP is the growth rate of
real GDP (RGDP), LR is labour regulation index (aggregate or its
different components taken one at a time), and a, b and c are regression
parameters.
Our analysis shows, as we would expect, that the growth rates of real
output and employment are positively related in all the countries. The
aggregate labour regulation index, however, has no significant relationship
(positive or negative) with employment growth in France, Germany6 and
the UK, after controlling for the macroeconomic environment as
represented by the trend in the growth of real GDP. This is also true for
the different components of the labour regulation index. There is one
exception – the trend in French labour law on working time is positively
5

Macroeconomic series are often found to be non-stationary at various levels,
with or without time-trends (Nelson and Plosser, 1992). If due adjustments (first
or higher order differencing) are not made to make these series stationary, the
problem of spurious regressions may arise. The first (log)-differencing of the
macroeconomic series carried out here makes them stationary (details of these
technicalities are omitted for the sake of brevity).
6
German employment growth shows one outlier in 1991. We used a spike
dummy (=1 for 1991 and 0 otherwise) and re-ran the regression. Our findings
were unaffected.
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related to employment growth. The USA is the only country where we
find an inverse relationship between labour regulation and employment
growth. This is because of the changes in the regulation of dismissal (the
aggregate of variables 16 to 24) – the only area in which there was a
significant change in US law over the period.7 This refers to the
introduction of the federal WARN law of 1988 (and effective from 1989)
mandating minimum notice periods and severance pay in the event of
economic dismissals.8
Next we examine whether labour law changes have an impact on labour
productivity. We have data on annual growth rate of labour productivity
per unit of labour input (LBPRD) for the four countries for the period
1971-2005/2006. Replicating our regression analysis by replacing DLN by
LBPRD in Equation 1, we can observe that the growth of real output and
labour productivity growth are directly related. There is, however, no
significant relationship between the productivity growth rate and trends in
the labour regulation indices for the two of the four countries, France and
UK (irrespective of the inclusion of the real growth rate in the regression).
For Germany, the indices concerning working time and dismissal are
7

These findings hold good even if we do not adjust for macroeconomic
fluctuations by setting b = 0 (that is, ignoring the real GDP growth rate) in the
regression equation. Our findings on labour law and employment growth are also
robust to this revised regression analysis, with one exception: the positive
relationship between employment growth and working time regulation in France
cannot be maintained when this revised regression is fitted.
8
The employment growth rate in the USA fell sharply between 1989 and 1991,
at a point when the growth rate of GDP was also falling and there was a (short)
recession. We observe the inverse relationship referred to in the text after
controlling for the rate of growth of GDP. After 1992 US employment growth
resumed but for the most of the 1990s the rate of growth was lower than it was in
the 1970s and 1980s. It is unlikely, in principle, that this long-run trend can be
ascribed solely to the WARN law, given the relatively limited nature of that
legislation and the high possibility that it simply crystallised a pre-existing
practice of voluntary notice and severance (see Addison and Blackburn, 1994).
As we suggest in the text below (section 3.4), in the context of a long time series
such as this, very great caution should be exercised in extrapolating from a single
legal reform. However, the result is at least suggestive, and highlights the
potential importance of this question, which could be explored more deeply in
future research by the addition of further controls and by sector-specific analyses.
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positively correlated with labour productivity growth at a very high level
of statistical significance (provided we take into account the real growth
rate). On the whole, there is somewhat weak evidence (significant at the
10 per cent level) of a positive relationship between the US labour
regulation index and labour productivity growth which is associated with
the change in the regulation of dismissal brought about by the WARN law
after 1989.
Next we examine whether labour regulations affect income distribution.
We use the share of wages in the total economy, for which time series
exist for the period and countries in question, as a proxy for the
redistributive effect of labour law. The wage share showed a declining
trend in all the countries throughout the period; in France and Germany
there were rising trends in the 1970s and declining trends thereafter while
the UK experienced a mild declining trend amid cyclical fluctuations. In
Equation 1 we replace DLN by a wage share variable (WGSH). In all the
four countries the wage share and real growth rate are inversely related –
the higher the real growth rate, the lower is the wage share. However,
there is no significant relationship between labour regulation and the wage
share.9 Thus labour law changes (which have mainly had the effect of
strengthening of protection for workers, with the exception of the British
case from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s) cannot be held responsible for
labour’s declining share of national income over this period in each of the
countries in our sample.
Finally we look at the issue of complementarities across forms of
regulation. We can see from the correlation matrix set out in Table 3 that
the level of labour regulation is positively correlated with that of
shareholder and creditor protection in both France and Germany. The
same is true, but to a lesser extent, in the United States. In other words, in
these systems, there are complementarities between the prevailing modes
of regulation of labour relations and corporate governance. In France and
Germany, for example, a high level of protection for workers has not
proved incompatible with greater shareholder protection: the score for
shareholder rights has been rising in these two countries across the whole
9

This result holds good even if we ignore the real growth rate in the regression
equation.
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period (Lele and Siems, 2007). In the UK, the situation is reversed: there
is an negative relationship between the level of labour law regulation and
the protection accorded to shareholders and creditors, (although it is not
statistically significant). In the US case, there is a weak but significant
correlation between the trends in regulation across the three areas of law.
This is a finding which requires some explanation, in the sense that it is
perhaps surprising that the inverse relationship between labour law and
company law that we find for the UK is not replicated for the US. The
explanation lies in the relatively low score given to US shareholder
protection law. For reasons explored in more detail elsewhere (see Lele
and Siems, 2007), US law is less protective of shareholder rights than is
conventionally believed; however, dispersed ownership and a high degree
of liquidity in capital markets might well be explained by factors not
accounted for in the shareholder protection index, in particular the
intensive nature of securities market regulation in the US context and the
substantial resources devoted to enforcement through the Securities and
Exchange Commission (see Jackson and Roe, 2007). On this basis, a
more complete picture of the regulatory framework in the US would
probably be consistent with the view that there is an inverse relationship
between labour law and shareholder protection, as in the UK.
Table 3
Correlations between labour regulation, shareholder protection and creditor
rights indices, 1970-2005

France
Labour Regulation
Index
Labour Regulation
Index
Shareholder
Protection
Index
Creditor Rights
Index

Germany

Shareholder
Protection
Index

Creditor Rights
Index

1.0
0.74*

1.0

0.82*

0.88*

1.0
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Index
Shareholder Protection
Index
Creditor Rights
Index
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Labour Regulation
Index
1.0

Shareholder Protection
Index

Creditor Rights
Index

0.85*

1.0

0.73*

0.89*

1.0

Labour Regulation
Index
1.0

Shareholder Protection
Index

Creditor Rights
Index

-0.13

1.0

-0.25

0.88*

1.0

Labour Regulation
Index
1.0

Shareholder Protection
Index

Creditor Rights
Index

0.38*

1.0

0.88*

0.4*

UK

Labour Regulation
Index
Shareholder Protection
Index
Creditor Rights
Index

USA

Labour Regulation
Index
Shareholder Protection
Index
Creditor Rights
Index

1.0

* Significant at the 5% level.
Source: CBR Datasets on Labour Regulation, Shareholder Protection and
Creditor Rights (Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007; Lele and Siems, 2007; Armour,
Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2008;
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm).
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D. INTERPRETING THE EVIDENCE
Table 4 summarises the results which have just been set out. The only
negative relationship is that between dismissal regulation and employment
growth in the US; but there is a countervailing increase here in labour
productivity. It is difficult to draw strong conclusions either way from the
US case because there were very few changes of any kind in the law
during the period being reviewed. While the time-series analysis we have
conducted is well suited to analyzing the consequences of change, it is less
effective in contexts where the variables being studied are stable over
time. The US result is driven by just one change in the law, the
introduction of minimum notice and severance pay rules in the WARN
legislation. Therefore it would be reasonable to regard it is as somewhat
tentative.10
Table 4
Summary of Main Findings

Legal variable
Regulation of working
time
Regulation of
dismissal

10

Outcome
variable
Employment
growth
Productivity
Employment
growth
Productivity
Productivity

Country

Relationship

France

+

Germany
United States

+
_

United States
Germany

+
+

Recent work on the impact of derogations from the employment at will rule in
several US states in the 1980s and 1990s suggests that the effects of changes to
employment law may be highly complex in the American context: it reports a
link between the tightening of legal controls over dismissal and an increase in
employment growth, a rise in labour productivity, but a fall in total factor
productivity in the manufacturing sector (Autor et al., 2007).
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The regulation of working time is positively correlated with productivity
levels in France and Germany, and the regulation of dismissal is positively
correlated with productivity levels in Germany; in neither case is there
evidence of offsetting reductions in employment. These findings imply
that labour regulation of this kind may have beneficial impacts when
combined with other institutions in the context of coordinated market
economies. The precise nature of these complementarities cannot be
observed in the data we have examined here, but could be studied in future
work.
The labour law indicator with the strongest relationship to the economic
variables is the regulation of dismissal, which has a positive effect on
productivity in two of the four countries studied. Working time regulation
is also shown to have a relationship to employment growth and
productivity in some contexts. Employee representation law and the
regulation of the right to strike do not appear to be correlated with either
employment or productivity.
We therefore have evidence that labour law change has had a positive
relationship to employment growth and to increases in productivity in
certain countries and in particular policy contexts. This relationship is by
no means uniform across the countries in the sample, and, indeed, there
are some contexts in which we find no link at all, either positive or
negative, between increasing regulation and economic outcomes. This
varied picture is what the indeterminacy hypothesis would predict.
Because labour laws most often codify and extend existing practices,
rather than imposing entirely novel rules on a previously regulated labour
market, we would not necessarily expect the consequences of legal change
to be substantial in every case. It is also possible that the parties to
employment contracts can adjust to new legislation in ways which reduces
any negative (or positive) economic consequences (Freeman, 2005). But
we can also see that labour law is not trivial: we report statistically
significant relationships between labour law trends and economic impacts
in certain contexts. These findings offer support to the complementarity
hypothesis, in so far as they suggest that some aspects of labour law
regulation, in particular laws on working time and dismissal, are most
likely to have the positive economic impacts predicted for them in
coordinated market systems, such as France and Germany. Our results are
consistent with those of Gatti (2008) on the existence of
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complementarities between employment protection legislation and
ownership concentration in coordinated market systems, although we
cannot observe the effects of ownership concentration directly in our
dataset. Our findings qualify or at least complicate the complementarity
hypothesis in one respect: if we look solely at developments in legal rules,
we can see that in France and Germany, there has been a high level of
labour law regulation but also an increase in shareholder protection over
the period in question. It is beyond the scope of the present study to
consider how far this change in the law governing shareholder rights might
have led to a shift in the prevailing pattern of share ownership in these
countries. This is a matter for future research. In Britain, by contrast,
there is evidence of an inverse relationship between the trend in labour law
and those in company and insolvency law. This is what we would expect
from a comparative political economy perspective – strong shareholder
protection is complementary to weak labour law. In the American case
there is no such negative relationship, but nor is the degree of correlation
between the different areas of regulation as strong as it is in France and
Germany. Some possible explanations for the surprising US result have
been noted (see section 3.3 above).

IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has offered a reassessment of the long-run economic impact of
labour laws. We suggested, firstly, that a theoretical reappraisal of the role
of the law in shaping economic outcomes was needed. In most economic
models, labour laws are seen as an exogenous interference with market
relations. We argued, drawing on recent developments in legal origins
theory and in comparative political economy, that this standard approach
is potentially misleading. This is, firstly, because labour laws are to, a
certain degree, endogenous to the economic and political environments in
which they operate. Formalised labour regulations generalize and extend
pre-existing social practices which can be understood as evolved responses
to coordination failures in labour markets; in addition, they are shaped to
varying degrees by interest-group configurations, macroeconomic
conditions, and long-run legal and political structures. To say that labour
law is shaped by elements in its economic environment as well as by
political and legal-institutional factors is not to imply a perfect fit;
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however, it may well be equally mistaken to assume that labour laws
always impose exogenous costs on firms. Secondly, and relatedly, labour
regulation is pluralistic: labour laws take effect not in isolation but through
and alongside self-regulation on the part of market actors and social
norms. An understanding of the economic impact of the formal law
should take into account the mediating role of these other institutions.
Thirdly, labour laws are systemic, that is to say, they operate in
conjunction with other, complementary institutions in market economies.
It is necessary to pay regard to these potential interactions when predicting
the effects of a change in the law.
The implications of viewing labour law in the ways just suggested are farreaching. The effects of labour law may be more indeterminate than
previously thought, in the sense of being highly context-dependent (the
‘indeterminacy hypothesis’). More specifically, labour law rules may be
expected to have efficiency-enhancing effects in situations where they
operate in conjunction with other institutional phenomena (the
‘complementarity hypothesis’). The perspective we have suggested also
opens up new insights on the claim that legal infrastructure may influence
both the content of labour law and its impact in terms of efficiency (the
‘legal origins hypothesis’).
A theoretical reappraisal of this kind points up the need for a better
empirical understanding of the way legal systems operate in economic
contexts such as that of the labour market. One aspect of this is the
development of reliable measures of legal regulation which capture change
in the content of rules over time. In this paper we have discussed
methodological issues involved in the coding of labour laws and presented
evidence from a new, longitudinal index of changes in labour law
regulation in France, Germany, the UK and the US from the early 1970s to
the present day. Analysis of the dataset offers some support for the weakform legal origin hypothesis, which claims that legal infrastructure has an
effect on the content of the law. However, the strong-form legal origin
claim, that common law systems are more likely to produce efficiencyenhancing rules than civil law ones, is not supported. Instead, there is
evidence to suggest that the economic effects of labour laws are not just
highly varied and complex, a result which is compatible with the
indeterminacy hypothesis, but also that they may be efficiency-enhancing
in certain contexts and in particular in civil law systems, a conclusion
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which is consistent with the complementarity hypothesis. Over the period
studied, the strengthening of dismissal laws had positive effects on
employment and productivity growth in France and Germany, and tighter
working time laws had a positive impact on employment growth in
France, after controlling for the macroeconomic environment as measured
by the growth in real GDP. A slight strengthening of dismissal controls
had a negative impact on employment growth but a positive effect on
productivity growth in the US. While these results must, in some respects,
be seen as tentative, they suggest that time-series analyses can cast new
light on the empirical effects of labour laws, while also confirming the
need for a more nuanced theoretical understanding of this issue.
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Appendix: Excerpt from CBR Labour Regulation Dataset: Coding of Dismissal Law in the UK

C. Regulation of dismissal
16. Legally mandated notice period (all
dismissals)

17. Legally mandated redundancy
compensation

18. Minimum qualifying period of
service for normal case of unjust
dismissal

Measures the length of notice, in
weeks, that has to be given to a worker
with 3 years’ employment. Normalise
the score so that 0 weeks = 0 and 12
weeks = 1.
Measures the amount of redundancy
compensation payable to a worker
made redundant after 3 years of
employment, measured in weeks of
pay. Normalise the score so that 0
weeks = 0 and 12 weeks = 1.

1970-1976:
0.19
1977-: 0.25

A 2-week norm was in effect between 1970 and 1975
(Contracts of Employment Act 1963); from 1975
(Employment Protection Act 1975) the period was 3
weeks.

1970-: 0.25

The normal rule throughout this period (Redundancy
Payments Act 1965 and successor statutes) is that
redundancy payments were calculated on the basis of 1
week’s employment for each year worked between the
ages of 22 and 41 (1.5 week for years over age of 41, and
0.5 weeks for years worked between 18 and 22). This is
subject to a statutory ceiling.

Measures the period of service
required before a worker qualifies for
general protection against unjust
dismissal. Normalise the score so that

1970-1971: 0

The qualifying period for general unfair dismissal
protection was two years between 1972 and 1974
(Industrial Relations Act 1971); one year from 1974 to
1975 (Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974); six

1972-1973:
0.33

3 years or more = 0, 0 months = 1
1974: 0.67
1975-1978:
0.83

months between 1975 and 1979 (Employment Protection
Act 1975); one year between 1979 and 1985 (‘July
orders’, 1979); two years between 1985 and 1999 (SI
1985); and one year again from 1999 (Employment
Relations Act 1999).

1979-1984:
0.67
1985-1998:
0.33
1999-: 0.67
19.
Law
imposes
constraints on dismissal

procedural

Equals 1 if a dismissal is necessarily
unjust if the employer fails to follow
procedural requirements prior to
dismissal

1970-1971: 0
1972-1986:
0.33

The general rule of UK unfair dismissal law is that a
dismissal is likely to be unfair if the employer fails to
adhere to procedural standards but is not inevitably so.
Up to 1987 the employer could avoid a finding of unfair
dismissal by showing that the lack of due process would

Equals 0.67 if failure to follow
procedural requirements will normally
lead to a finding of unjust dismissal.

1987-2004:
0.67
2004-: 0.33

Equals 0.33 if failure to follow
procedural requirement is just one
factor taken into account in unjust
dismissal cases.
Equals 0 if there are no procedural
requirements for dismissal.

20.
Law
imposes
constraints on dismissal

substantive

Scope for gradations between 0 and 1
to reflect changes in the strength of the
law.
Equals 1 if dismissal is only
permissible for serious misconduct or
fault of the employee.

1970-1971: 0
1972-: 0.5

have made no difference to the outcome because the
dismissal was substantively fair. In 1987 that rule was
reversed by decision of the House of Lords (Polkey v.
A.E. Dayton Services Ltd.). With effect from 2004 the
Polkey decision was reversed by statute (Employment
Act 2002) but only if the employer could show that it had
complied with a minimal obligation to hold a hearing
prior to dismissal. This latter requirement is substantially
below the threshold of procedural fairness which
generally applies to unfair dismissal law.

UK unfair dismissal law (now contained in Employment
Rights Act 1996) sets out a range of ‘potentially fair’
reasons for dismissal which include lack of capability,

Equals 0.67 if dismissal is lawful
according to a wider range of
legitimate reasons (misconduct, lack of
capability, redundancy, etc.).
Equals 0.33 if dismissal is permissible
if it is ‘just’ or ‘fair’ as defined by case
law.
Equals 0 if employment is at will (i.e.,
no cause dismissal is normally
permissible).
Scope for gradations between 0 and 1
to reflect changes in the strength of the
law.

misconduct, lack of qualifications, redundancy, statutory
bar, and a residual category (some other substantial
reason of a kind to justify the dismissal). The existence
of the residual category is important in diluting the
protection of employees, suggesting a coding between the
middle two categories set out in the template.

21. Reinstatement normal remedy for
unfair dismissal

Equals 1 if reinstatement is the normal
remedy for unjust dismissal and is
regularly enforced.

1970-1971: 0
1972-: 0.33

Equals 0.67 if reinstatement and
compensation are, de iure and de facto,
alternative remedies.

Reinstatement is stated to be the ‘principal’ remedy for
unfair dismissal (Employment Rights Act 1996) but this
rule is qualified by many significant restrictions on the
powers of tribunals to award reinstatement. In practice
reinstatement is very rarely awarded. There are also only
very limited powers to order the interim reinstatement of
an applicant pending the full hearing of the claim.

Equals 0.33 if compensation is the
normal remedy.
Equals 0 if no remedy is available as of
right.

22. Notification of dismissal

Scope for further gradations between 0
and 1 to reflect changes in the strength
of the law.
Equals 1 if by law or binding collective

1970-1971: 0

The normal rule since the inception of the unfair

agreement the employer has to obtain
the permission of a state body or third
body prior to an individual dismissal.
Equals 0.67 if a state body or third
party has to be notified prior to the
dismissal.
Equals 0.33 if the employer has to give
the worker written reasons for the
dismissal.
Equals 0 if an oral statement of
dismissal to the worker suffices.
Scope for further gradations between 0
and 1 to reflect changes in the strength
of the law.

1972-: 0.33

dismissal jurisdiction in 1971 (see now Employment
Rights Act 1996) is that the employee must be given
written reasons in writing.

23. Redundancy selection

Equals 1 if by law or binding collective
agreement the employer must follow
priority rules based on seniority,
marital status, number or dependants,
etc., prior to dismissing for
redundancy.

1970-1973: 0
1974-: 1

Dismissal in breach of a ‘customary’ selection procedure
such as ‘last in, first out’ was automatically unfair
between 1975 (Trade Union and Labour Relations Act
1974) and 1989 (Employment Act 1989). After 1989, the
employer continued to be under a duty, under general
unfair dismissal law, to have regard to priority rules
governing selection for redundancy.

Equals 0 otherwise.

24. Priority in re-employment

Scope for further gradations between 0
and 1 to reflect changes in the strength
of the law.
Equals 1 if by law or binding collective
agreement the employer must follow
priority rules relating to the reemployment of former workers.
Equals 0 otherwise.

1970-: 0

There is no rule of priority re-employment in UK labour
law.

C. Regulation of dismissal

Scope for further gradations between 0
and 1 to reflect changes in the strength
of the law.
Measures the regulation of dismssal,
calculated as the average of variables
16-24

Source: CBR Labour Regulation Dataset (Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007; http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm).

